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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

In the Matter of Richard J. Breibart, Respondent. 
Appellate Case No. 2015-001982 
Opinion No. 27592 
Submitted November 4, 2015 – Filed November 25, 2015 
DISBARRED 
Lesley M. Coggiola, Disciplinary Counsel, and C. Tex 
Davis, Jr., Senior Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, both of 
Columbia, for Office of Disciplinary Counsel. 
Richard J. Breibart, of Lexington, pro se. 
PER CURIAM: In this attorney disciplinary matter, respondent and the Office 
of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) have entered into an Agreement for Discipline by 
Consent (Agreement) pursuant to Rule 21 of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary 
Enforcement (RLDE) contained in Rule 413 of the South Carolina Appellate Court 
Rules (SCACR). In the Agreement, respondent admits misconduct and consents to 
disbarment with conditions.  He requests the disbarment be imposed retroactively 
to June 1, 2012, the date of his interim suspension. In the Matter of Breibart, 398 
S.C. 123, 727 S.E.2d 740 (2012).  We accept the Agreement and disbar respondent 
from the practice of law in this state retroactively to the date of respondent's
interim suspension.  We further impose the conditions as stated hereafter in this 
opinion.  The facts, as set forth in the Agreement, are as follows. 
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Facts 
Matter I 
From January 1, 1993 through December 31, 2003, respondent performed legal 
services for or rendered legal advice to Client A on more than one occasion and, as 
a result, established an attorney/client relationship with Client A.  Respondent 
engaged in business transactions with and/or received loans from Client A on more 
than one occasion while he was respondent's client or a client of respondent's law 
practice. 
Matter II 
Respondent self-reported that, from 1994 until 2002, he borrowed significant sums
of monies from several clients.  He admits that some of the loans were not 
transmitted in writing  to the clients and/or the clients did not consent in writing to 
essential terms of the loan and respondent's role in the transaction.    
Matter III 
In September 2012, respondent was indicted on ten (10) counts of mail fraud, 
extortion, and wire fraud.  Respondent was charged with devising a scheme 
whereby he obtained money and property from his clients by false and fraudulent 
pretenses. The scheme with regard to some of respondent's clients was as follows:
respondent would contact clients, former clients, or family members of former 
clients who had readily accessible money and inform them that the clients were in 
imminent danger of being arrested and/or of losing their money; he would instruct 
the clients or clients' family members to transfer large sums of money to him to be 
deposited in his trust account for safekeeping or to ensure that the investigation 
would be closed; he encouraged the clients or clients' family members to locate as
much money as possible, including liquidating retirement accounts and asking 
family members for money; respondent would accept the funds from his clients or 
his clients' family members and convert those funds to pay for expenses and 
obligations relating to his law firm, to himself personally, and to other clients.  
There were never any civil actions or criminal investigations regarding the claims 
respondent made to his clients.   
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On August 12, 2013, respondent pled guilty to one count of mail fraud.  On March 
4, 2014, respondent was sentenced to sixty-three (63) months in the custody of the 
United States Bureau of Prisons and to three (3) years of supervised release.  In 
addition, respondent was ordered to begin repayment of restitution of 
$2,419,326.50 in monthly payments of $100 sixty (60) days after his release from 
prison. 
Matter IV 
Respondent represented Complainant's son on state criminal charges.  Respondent 
informed Complainant that he might be the target of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation in relation to the son's criminal charges and, that, in addition to 
potential criminal charges, Complainant might be exposed to potential civil 
liability. Respondent instructed Complainant to liquidate and transfer all available 
funds to respondent to be held in his trust account for safekeeping.  Complainant 
transferred $393,526.29 to respondent pursuant to respondent's request.  
Respondent accepted the funds from Complainant and converted those funds to 
pay expenses and obligations relating to his law firm, to respondent personally, and 
to other clients. Respondent represents he was contacted by the United States 
Attorney's Office regarding the conduct of Complainant's son and/or other family 
members, however, there was no formal federal investigation.  Complainant filed a 
claim with the Lawyers' Fund for Client Protection (Lawyers' Fund) and was 
awarded $9,546.08.
Matter V 
On or about October 2011, Client B retained respondent to represent him in a 
divorce action. At that time, respondent instructed Client B that his retainer fee 
would be $45,000. Respondent instructed Client B that it would also be in his best 
interests to transfer an additional $45,000 to respondent to make it more difficult 
for Client B's wife to find and obtain the proceeds during the divorce.  Client B 
wired $90,000 to respondent. At the time of respondent's interim suspension, 
Client B's funds were gone and there was no accounting as to how the funds had 
been used by respondent. Client B had to secure new counsel to complete his 
divorce case. Client B did not file a claim with the Lawyers' Fund.  
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Matter VI 
On or about July 2011, Clients C retained respondent to represent them in a civil 
action to recover damages to their property.  Clients C paid respondent a $15,000 
retainer which was characterized in the retainer agreement as a "non-refundable" 
retainer. In or around December 2011, Clients C contacted respondent because 
they were not satisfied with the lack of communication and diligence from 
respondent. Clients C informed respondent that they wished to terminate the 
relationship and requested the return of any unearned legal fees and their client 
file. Respondent informed Clients C that, pursuant to the retainer agreement he 
had "set up the file" and that the $15,000 retainer had been earned.  Respondent 
informed Clients C that he could continue the representation or they could drop the 
case, but that, in either event, he was keeping the retainer fee. Clients C reluctantly 
elected to continue with the case.  At the time of respondent's interim suspension, 
Clients C retrieved their client file from the Attorney to Protect Respondent's
Clients' Interests.  The client file consisted mostly of materials provided to
respondent from Clients C.  There was no correspondence by respondent or any 
documents from an alleged expert witness, as respondent had discussed with 
Clients C. Clients C filed a claim with the Lawyers' Fund and were awarded 
$11,551.24. 
Matter VII 
On May 12, 2011, Client D retained respondent to represent him in an action to 
recover misappropriated funds.  Client D paid respondent a $10,000 retainer fee.  
In February 2012, respondent informed Client D that he was negotiating a 
settlement.  In May 2012, Client D telephoned respondent on several occasions 
seeking an update about the status of his case.  Respondent failed to return these 
calls. On June 1, 2012, respondent was placed on interim suspension.  
Complainant D retrieved his client file from the Attorney to Protect Respondent's
Clients' Interests.  The client file consisted of the retainer agreement, a copy of the 
cancelled retainer check, and one letter.  The file did not contain any accounting of 
how the legal fees had been earned by respondent.  Client D filed a claim with the 
Lawyers' Fund and was awarded $1,193.26.  
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Matter VIII 
Client E retained respondent on April 12, 2012, to represent him on pending 
criminal charges.  As of May 2012, Client E had paid respondent $25,000 in legal 
fees. On June 1, 2012, respondent was placed on interim suspension.  There were 
insufficient funds in respondent's trust account to return any unearned fees to 
Client E. Client E filed a claim with the Lawyers' Fund and was awarded 
$2,983.15. 
Matter VIX 
On April 27, 2012, Client F retained respondent to represent her on pending 
criminal charges.  Client F paid respondent $7,500 in legal fees.  On June 1, 2012, 
respondent was placed on interim suspension.  There were insufficient funds in 
respondent's trust account to return any unearned legal fees to Client F.  Client F 
filed a claim with the Lawyers' Fund and was awarded $724.90. 
Matter X 
In June 2011, Complainant retained respondent to represent her son who had 
pending federal and state criminal charges.  Complainant paid respondent $25,000 
in legal fees to handle the case. Respondent assured Complainant that he would be 
able to consolidate both federal and state criminal charges.   
Respondent appeared with Complainant's son in October 2011 for him to enter a 
plea to the state charges. Respondent informed his client that he would receive an 
eight (8) year sentence when, in fact, the client received a twelve (12) year 
sentence. Respondent failed to communicate with client after the plea.  At the time 
of respondent's interim suspension, the client's federal charges were still pending.   
Complainant filed a claim with the Lawyers' Fund and was awarded $1,193.26.
Matter XI 
Client G paid respondent $125,000 to represent him in various matters.  On June 1, 
2012, respondent was placed on interim suspension.  There were insufficient funds 
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in respondent's trust account to return any unearned legal fees to Client G.  Client 
G filed a complaint with the Lawyers' Fund.  He was awarded $4,773.04. 
Matter XII 
In December 2009, Client H retained respondent to represent her in a criminal 
matter. Client H paid respondent $7,500 in legal fees.  Client H's case was 
unresolved at the time of respondent's interim suspension on June 1, 2012.  There 
were insufficient funds in respondent's trust account to return any unearned legal 
fees to Client H. Client H filed a claim with the Lawyers' Fund and was awarded 
$417.64. 
Matter XIII 
In July 2011, Client I retained respondent to handle a child custody modification 
case. Client I paid respondent $7,500 in legal fees. On June 1, 2012, respondent 
was placed on interim suspension. At that time, Client I's case was still 
unresolved.  There were insufficient funds in respondent's trust account to return 
any unearned legal fees to Client I.  Client I filed a claim with the Lawyers' Fund 
and was awarded $447.47.
Matter XIV 
Client J retained respondent in June 2009 to represent him in two disability actions 
against Liberty Mutual and Wells Fargo and paid respondent $25,000 in legal fees.  
In October 2009, respondent informed Client J that he needed an additional 
$15,000 in legal fees. Respondent had Client J execute an Agreement in which 
respondent guaranteed that the $15,000 would be refunded to Client J regardless of 
the result of the cases. Both cases were resolved by the end of March 2010.  On 
June 1, 2012, respondent was placed on interim suspension.  There were 
insufficient funds in respondent's trust account to return any unearned legal fees to 
Client J. Client J filed a claim with the Lawyers' Fund and was awarded 
$4,057.08. 
Matter XV 
On April 7, 2011, Client K retained respondent to represent her in a custody matter 
and paid respondent $7,500 in legal fees.  Client K's case was still unresolved 
when respondent was placed on interim suspension on June 1, 2012.  There were 
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insufficient funds in respondent's trust account to return any unearned legal fees to 
Client K. Client K filed a claim with the Lawyers' Fund and was awarded $447.47.  
Matter XVI 
In early 2009, Client L had retained respondent to handle a domestic matter.  In 
early 2011, Client L met with respondent to discuss another matter regarding her 
husband. Respondent convinced Client L that her husband was involved in a tax 
evasion scheme and that Client L needed to set up a trust account for the benefit of 
her four children. Client L transferred $130,000 from her money market account 
to respondent's trust account.  In fact, Client L's husband was not being 
investigated for any criminal scheme.  
On June 1, 2012, respondent was placed on interim suspension.  There were 
insufficient funds in respondent's trust account to return any monies to Client L.  
Client L filed a claim with the Lawyers' Fund and was awarded $4,773.04.   
Matter XVII 
In May 2009, Client M retained respondent to represent her in a civil matter.  
Client M paid respondent $40,000 in legal fees.  On June 1, 2012, respondent was 
placed on interim suspension.  At that time, Client M's case was still unresolved.
There were insufficient funds in respondent's trust account to return any unearned 
legal fees to Client M. Client M filed a claim with the Lawyers' Fund and was 
awarded $3,221.80. 
Matter XVIII 
In November 2010, Client N retained respondent to set up a conservatorship for his 
son who was due to be released from prison.  On November 30, 2010, Client N 
transferred $125,000 to respondent's trust account to fund the conservatorship.  
Respondent informed Client N that he would file the appropriate documents with 
the Probate Court to establish the conservatorship.   
In May 2011, Client N's son was released from prison.  Client N's son died in June 
2011. At the time, respondent had not set up the conservatorship.  Client N 
requested respondent return the $125,000.  Respondent rebuffed Client N's request 
and told him he would release the funds after the probate of the son's estate.   
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In August 2011, Client N sold his home. At the closing, Client N learned that the 
Department of Justice held a $17,500 lien on the property relating to the son.  
Respondent instructed Client N to deposit $27,000 into his trust account and that 
he would work to resolve the lien. Client N transferred $27,000 into respondent's
trust account. As months passed, respondent failed to keep Client N apprised of 
his progress on both matters.   
On June 1, 2012, respondent was placed on interim suspension.  There were 
insufficient funds in respondent's trust account to return any unearned legal fees to 
Client N. Client N filed a claim with the Lawyers' Fund and was awarded 
$4,773.04. 
Matter XIX 
Client O retained respondent for a domestic matter and paid respondent a $5,000 
retainer fee. On June 1, 2012, respondent was placed on interim suspension.  
Client O's case was still unresolved.  There were insufficient funds in respondent's
trust account to return any unearned legal fees to Client O.  Client O filed a claim 
with the Lawyers' Fund and was awarded $298.31.   
Matter XX 
On March 31, 2012, Complainant retained respondent to represent her son in a 
criminal matter.  Complainant paid respondent $25,000.  Respondent went to 
Complainant's son's first hearing.  On June 1, 2012, respondent was placed on 
interim suspension.  Complainant son's case was still unresolved.  There were 
insufficient funds in respondent's trust account to return any unearned legal fees to 
Complainant.  Complainant filed a claim with the Lawyers' Fund and was awarded 
$2,386.52. 
Matter XXI 
On May 15, 2012, Client P retained respondent to represent him on a charge of 
Public Disorderly Conduct. Client P paid a $5,200 retainer fee to respondent.  On 
June 1, 2012, respondent was placed on interim suspension.  Client P's case was 
unresolved at the time of respondent's suspension.  There were insufficient funds in
respondent's trust account to return any unearned legal fees to Client P.  Client P 
had to retain another attorney to complete his case.  Client P filed a claim with the 
Lawyers' Fund and was awarded $596.63.      
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Matter XXII 
Client Q retained respondent to represent her on a criminal charge of Harassment 
in the 2nd degree and paid respondent a $7,500 retainer fee.  Respondent failed to 
handle Client Q's case in a diligent manner.    
On June 1, 2012, respondent was placed on interim suspension.  Client Q's case 
was unresolved at the time of respondent's suspension.  There were insufficient 
funds in respondent's trust account to return any unearned legal fees to Client Q.  
Client Q had to retain another attorney to complete her case.  Client Q filed a claim 
with the Lawyers' Fund and was awarded $313.23. 
Matter XXIII 
On April 16, 2012, Client R retained respondent to represent him on a criminal 
charge. Client R paid respondent $8,974.14. On the same date, respondent sent a 
letter to the court requesting a jury trial.   
On June 1, 2012, respondent was placed on interim suspension.  Client R's case 
was unresolved at the time of respondent's suspension.  No other work than the 
jury trial request had been performed by respondent.  There were insufficient funds 
in respondent's trust account to return any unearned legal fees to Client R.  Client 
R had to retain another attorney to complete his case.  Client R filed a claim with 
the Lawyers' Fund and was awarded $856.76. 
Matter XXIV 
Client S retained respondent on May 18, 2011, to represent him in a domestic 
matter and paid respondent a $5,000 retainer fee.  On October 13, 2011, respondent 
made a court appearance on Client S's behalf.   
On June 1, 2012, respondent was placed on interim suspension.  Client S's case 
was unresolved at the time of respondent's suspension.  There were insufficient 
funds in respondent's trust account to return any unearned legal fees to Client S.  
Client S filed a claim with the Lawyers' Fund and was awarded $298.31. 
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Matter XXV 
Complainant retained respondent to represent her juvenile son in a criminal matter.  
She paid a $25,000 retainer fee to respondent.  Other than a few telephone calls, 
respondent performed little to no work on the case.   
On June 1, 2012, respondent was placed on interim suspension.  Complainant's 
son's case was unresolved at the time of respondent's suspension.  Complainant had 
to borrow additional funds to hire another attorney.  There were insufficient funds 
in respondent's trust account to return any unearned legal fees to Complainant.  
Complainant filed a claim with the Lawyers' Fund and was awarded $2,983.15.
Matter XXVI 
On April 3, 2012, Client T retained respondent to represent him in a domestic 
matter. Client T paid respondent a retainer of $500.  On June 1, 2012, respondent 
was placed on interim suspension. Client T's case was unresolved at the time of 
respondent's suspension.  There were insufficient funds in respondent's trust 
account to return any unearned legal fees to Client T.  Client T filed a claim with 
the Lawyers' Fund and was awarded $47.73. 
Matter XXVII 
Client U retained respondent to represent her in connection with injuries suffered 
in an automobile accident.  Respondent was able to negotiate a $23,000 settlement.  
Client U executed the necessary release and endorsed the settlement check in 
March 2012. The funds were deposited in respondent's trust account.  On June 1, 
2012, respondent was placed on interim suspension.  There were insufficient funds 
in respondent's trust account to return any settlement monies to Client U.  Client U 
filed a claim with the Lawyers' Fund and was awarded $2,571.83. 
Matter XXVIII 
In May 2010, Client V retained respondent to handle a criminal matter.  Client V 
paid a $40,000 retainer fee to respondent. On June 1, 2012, respondent was placed 
on interim suspension. Client V's criminal matter was still pending at that time.  
There were insufficient funds in respondent's trust account to return any unearned 
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legal fees to Client V. Client V filed a claim with the Lawyers' Fund and was 
awarded $4,057.08.
Matter XXIX 
In September 2007, Client W retained respondent to handle civil litigation against 
his partners in SouthCable, LLC. Client W paid respondent an initial retainer fee 
of $25,000. Respondent later informed Client W that the South Financial Group 
was going to bring litigation against Client W.  Client W paid respondent $100,000 
to defend this alleged litigation.  The litigation did not materialize.  Over the years, 
Client W paid respondent an additional $134,000 for this matter.  At the time of 
respondent's interim suspension on June 1, 2012, the SouthCable, LLC, matter had 
been tried and the court was waiting for a proposed order from the parties.  There 
were insufficient funds in respondent's trust account to return any unearned legal 
fees to Client W.  Client W filed a claim with the Lawyers' Fund.  Client W was 
awarded $4,773.04. 
Matter XXX 
In March 2012, Client X retained respondent to handle a domestic matter.  Client 
X paid respondent a $7,500 retainer fee.  On June 1, 2012, respondent was placed 
on interim suspension. Client X's domestic matter was still pending at that time.  
There were insufficient funds in respondent's trust account to return any unearned 
legal fees to Client X. Client X filed a claim with the Lawyers' Fund and was 
awarded $626.46.
Matter XXXI 
Client Y retained respondent in October 2011 to represent him against an 
allegation of child molestation. Client Y paid respondent a $25,000 retainer fee.  
On June 1, 2012, respondent was placed on interim suspension.  Client Y's client 
file contained no evidence of any work completed by respondent.  No criminal 
charges were ever brought against Client Y.  There were insufficient funds in 
respondent's trust account to return any unearned legal fees to Client Y.  
Matter XXXII 
In May 2011, Client Z retained respondent to represent him in a suit against 
Michelin North America, Inc. in an effort to remove his ex-wife from being a 
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beneficiary for death benefits.  Client Z paid respondent a $20,000 retainer fee.  On 
June 1, 2012, respondent was placed on interim suspension.  Client Z learned that 
very little work had been done on his case.  There were insufficient funds in 
respondent's trust account to return any unearned legal fees to Client Z.  Client Z 
filed a claim with the Lawyers' Fund.  Client Z was awarded $2,016.61.
Matter XXXIII 
Client AA retained respondent in July 2009 because of a concern about potential 
criminal charges.  Client AA paid respondent a $7,500 retainer fee.  Periodically, 
Client AA would call respondent to find out the status of the potential charges.  
Respondent would inform Client AA that he was "working" on the case.  On June 
1, 2012, respondent was placed on interim suspension.  Client AA obtained his 
client filed from the Attorney to Protect Respondent's Clients' Interests.  The only 
document in the file was a notation that respondent had reviewed the file in August 
2011. There were insufficient funds in respondent's trust account to return any 
unearned legal fees to Client AA.  Client AA filed a claim with the Lawyers' Fund 
and was awarded $894.94. 
Matter XXXIV 
On March 6, 2012, Client BB retained respondent for a child support modification 
case. Client BB paid respondent a $5,250 retainer fee.  On June 1, 2012, 
respondent was placed on interim suspension.  Client BB's domestic matter was 
still pending at that time. There were insufficient funds in respondent's trust 
account to return any unearned legal fees to Client BB. Client BB filed a claim 
with the Lawyers' Fund.  Client BB was awarded $544.36.
Matter XXXV 
Client CC retained respondent in early 2009 to represent him on drug-related 
criminal charges.  Client CC paid respondent a $20,000 retainer fee.  On March 4, 
2010, Client CC pled guilty to Trafficking in Cocaine, more than twenty-eight (28) 
grams.  Client CC only pled guilty because of misrepresentations made by 
respondent. Specifically, respondent told Client CC that a suppression motion had 
been filed and denied by the court. This was untrue.  In addition, respondent did 
not allow Client CC to cooperate with law enforcement officials.  Client CC's
cooperation could have resulted in a reduced sentence.  On September 24, 2013, 
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Client CC's Application for Post-Conviction Relief was granted based on 
respondent's misrepresentations.   
Matter XXXVI
Client DD retained respondent to handle various legal matters for him and his 
businesses. Over the years, respondent held substantial monies in trust for Client 
DD. At the time of his interim suspension, respondent should have held $236,500 
in trust for Client DD. Respondent admits that Client DD's monies were 
misappropriated by him to pay for expenses and obligations related to his law firm, 
to himself personally, and to other clients.  There were insufficient funds in 
respondent's trust account to return any monies to Client DD.  Client DD filed a 
claim with the Lawyers' Fund and was awarded $4,773.04.1
Claims Awarded and Paid by the Lawyers' Fund  
According to the Agreement for Discipline by Consent, the Lawyers' Fund 
received claims totaling $5,606,281.33 against respondent and approved awards in 
the amount of $1,676,081.96. Due to the cap on payments, the Lawyers' Fund paid 
a total of $200,000.07 to the claimants, most of whom only received a small 
percentage of the amount approved.2
Law 
Respondent admits that by his conduct he violated the following provisions of the 
Rules of Professional Conduct (RPC) contained in Rule 407 of the South Carolina 
Appellate Court Rules (SCACR):  Rule 1.1 (lawyer shall provide competent 
representation); Rule 1.2 (lawyer shall abide by client's decisions regarding 
objectives of representation); Rule 1.3 (lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence 
and promptness in representing client); Rule 1.4 (lawyer shall reasonably consult 
1 Not all instances of client misconduct are necessarily identified in this opinion; 
instances of misconduct are addressed in the Plea Agreement and Judgment in a 
Criminal Case which are attached to the Agreement for Discipline by Consent and 
are matters of public record.
2 See Rule 411(c) (1), SCACR (payment to any claimant by Lawyers' Fund shall 
not exceed sum of $40,000 per claim; provided, however, that the aggregate total 
of claims paid per attorney shall not exceed $200,000).
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with client about means by which client's objectives are to be accomplished, keep 
client reasonably informed about status of matter, and promptly comply with 
reasonable requests for information); Rule 1.5 (lawyer shall not make agreement 
for, charge, or collect unreasonable fee or unreasonable amount for expenses); 
Rule 1.8 (lawyer shall not enter into business transaction with client or knowingly 
acquire pecuniary interest adverse to client unless transaction and terms on which 
lawyer acquires interest are fair and reasonable to client and are fully disclosed and 
transmitted in writing in a manner that can be reasonably understood by client, 
client is advised in writing of desirability of seeking and is given reasonable 
opportunity to seek advice of independent legal counsel on transaction, and client 
gives informed consent, in a writing signed by client, to essential terms of 
transaction and lawyer's role in the transaction, including whether lawyer is 
representing client in transaction); Rule 1.15 (lawyer shall hold property of clients 
or third persons in lawyer's possession in connection with representation separate 
from lawyer's own property; lawyer shall deposit into client trust account unearned 
legal fees and expenses that have been paid in advance, to be withdrawn by lawyer 
only as fees are earned or expenses incurred, unless lawyer and client have entered 
into written agreement concerning handling of fees paid in advance pursuant to 
Rule 1.5(f), RPC; lawyer shall promptly deliver to client or third person any funds 
or other property client or third person entitled to receive); Rule 1.16 (upon 
termination of representation, lawyer shall refund any advance payment of fee or 
expense that has not been earned or incurred); Rule 3.4 (lawyer shall not falsify 
evidence); Rule 8.1 (in connection with disciplinary matter, lawyer shall not 
knowingly make false statement of material fact or fail to disclose fact necessary to 
correct misapprehension known by lawyer to have arisen in disciplinary matter, or 
knowingly fail to respond to lawful demand for information from disciplinary 
authority); Rule 8.4 (a) (it is professional misconduct for lawyer to violate Rules of 
Professional Conduct); Rule 8.4(b) (it is professional misconduct for lawyer to 
commit criminal act that reflects adversely on lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or 
fitness as lawyer in other respects); Rule 8.4(c) (it is professional misconduct for 
lawyer to commit criminal act involving moral turpitude); Rule 8.4(d) (it is 
professional misconduct for lawyer to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, 
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation); and Rule 8.4(e) (it is professional misconduct 
for lawyer to engage in conduct prejudicial to administration of justice).  In 
addition, respondent admits his conduct violated the Lawyer's Oath contained in 
Rule 402(k),SCACR. Respondent further admits his conduct violated provisions 
of Rule 417, SCACR. 
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Respondent also admits he has violated the following Rules for Lawyer 
Disciplinary Enforcement, Rule 413, SCACR:  Rule 7(a)(1) (it is ground for 
discipline for lawyer to violate Rules of Professional Conduct) and Rule 7(a)(5) (it 
is ground for discipline for lawyer to engage in conduct tending to pollute 
administration of justice or bring courts or legal profession into disrepute or 
conduct demonstrating unfitness to practice law). 
 
Conclusion 
 
We accept the Agreement for Discipline by Consent and disbar respondent from 
the practice of law in this state, retroactively to June 1, 2012, the date of his interim 
suspension. In the Matter of Breibart, supra. In addition, we impose the following 
conditions: 
 
1. within thirty (30) days of the date of this opinion, respondent shall enter into 
a payment plan with the Commission on Lawyer Conduct (the Commission) 
to pay the costs incurred in the investigation and prosecution of this matter 
by ODC and the Commission ($1,059.41) and to reimburse the Lawyers' 
Fund for all amounts paid to the claimants ($200,000.07); the payment plan 
shall consider respondent's ability to pay and all obligations are subject to 
the terms and conditions of prior judicial orders; 
 
2. 	  respondent shall not apply for readmission until he has completed all terms 
and conditions of his criminal sentence, including the payment of fines and 
restitution;3   
 
3. respondent shall not apply for readmission until he has paid in full a) all 
parties whose claims approved by the Lawyers' Fund were only partially 
paid;4 b) $90,000 to Client B who did not file a claim with the Lawyers' 
Fund and is not covered by the criminal restitution plan; and c) $25,000 to 
Client Y who did not file a claim with the Lawyers' Fund and is not covered 
by the criminal restitution plan; and   
3 
 
4 Payments to these parties may be offset by any amount paid by respondent 
through the criminal restitution plan.  
See Matter III.
25 

  
 
 
 
4. respondent shall complete the Trust Account School prior to applying for 
readmission.    
Within fifteen (15) days of the date of this opinion, respondent shall file an 
affidavit with the Clerk of Court showing that he has complied with Rule 30 of 
Rule 413, SCACR, and shall also surrender his Certificate of Admission to the 
Practice of Law to the Clerk of Court. 
DISBARRED. 
TOAL, C.J., PLEICONES, BEATTY, KITTREDGE and HEARN, JJ., 
concur. 
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Jr., of Surfside Beach, both for Respondent/Appellant. 

MCDONALD, J.:  In this wage dispute action, Appellant/Respondent CFI Sales 
& Marketing, Ltd., d/b/a Westgate Resorts (CFI), appeals the circuit court's post-
trial ruling that the reserve and charge back components of CFI's employment 
contracts with Respondents/Appellants (the Zinn Plaintiffs)1 violated the South 
Carolina Payment of Wages Act.2  On cross-appeal, the Zinn Plaintiffs argue the 
circuit court erred in (1) directing a verdict against Lynn Lanpher, Khalif 
Middleton, Sherry Singleton, Steven Thoni, and Michael Wills; (2) allowing the 
jury to consider terms of the employment contract that the circuit court 
subsequently determined to be illicit; (3) directing a verdict on their causes of 
action for breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act; and (4) limiting the 
amount of attorney's fees awarded.  We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. 
FACTS/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
CFI is a timeshare developer of several resorts, including the Westgate Myrtle 
Beach Oceanfront Resort. The Zinn Plaintiffs worked for CFI as sales 
representatives (Sales Representatives) in the early-to-mid 2000s.  The Zinn 
Plaintiffs' employment contracts with CFI addressed, among other things, their 
compensation both during their employment and after their respective discharges 
from CFI.  The present case (the Zinn action) is the second lawsuit involving 
several former Sales Representatives' allegations of unpaid wages against CFI.  All 
plaintiffs in the Zinn action were also parties in the case of Judith A. Parker, 
Caroline Jordan, Christopher J. DeCaro, and Charles S. Walker, Jr., individually 
and on behalf of others similarly situated v. CFI Sales & Marketing, Ltd. d/b/a 
Westgate Resorts3 (the Parker action). 
1 As there are thirteen individual Respondents/Appellants, we will name them
individually only when necessary.   
2 S.C. Code Ann. §§ 41-10-10 to -110 (Supp. 2014).
3 Civil Action Number 2007-CP-26-5478. 
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The Parker Action 
On September 4, 2007, Judith A. Parker, Caroline Jordan, Christopher J. DeCaro, 
and Charles S. Walker, Jr. (the Parker Plaintiffs) filed a civil action against CFI, 
seeking class certification and setting forth causes of action for recovery of the 
following: (1) "wages, penalties, and attorney's fees," (2) breach of contract, and 
(3) breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act.  The Parker Plaintiffs also 
sought an accounting and a declaratory judgment "finding CFI's practices 
regarding payment of wages to be in degradation of statutory laws."  Among other 
allegations, the Parker Plaintiffs claimed that the reserve account and charge back 
provisions of the CFI employment contracts violated the South Carolina Payment 
of Wages Act (Wages Act) in several respects, including the timing for final 
payments made after a Sales Representative had been discharged from
employment.  See S.C. Code Ann. §§ 41-10-10 to -110 (Supp. 2014).  The 
Honorable J. Michael Baxley certified a class consisting of former CFI Sales 
Representatives who previously worked in Myrtle Beach and had reserve accounts 
during the relevant period established by the court.   
CFI compensated its Sales Representatives on a commission basis for each sale of 
a timeshare interest.  The commission due to each Sales Representative was paid 
within a prescribed period after each sale, less a contractually agreed upon 
percentage of such commission allocated to a "reserve account."  Such 
commissions—less the amount allocated to the reserve account—were paid to the 
Sales Representatives shortly after the sale even though the timeshare purchaser 
paid only a small percentage of the total purchase price at closing, often financing 
as much as 95% of the purchase price through a note and mortgage (collectively, 
Note and Mortgage) held by the seller.   
Each Sales Representative contractually agreed to fund the reserve account with 
10% of the commissions earned. This was designed to provide a measure of 
protection to CFI against defaults by timeshare purchasers on the Notes and 
Mortgages. The Sales Representatives agreed that the reserve portion of his or her 
commissions would be retained in the reserve account until the timeshare 
purchaser made six timely, consecutive monthly payments on the Note and 
Mortgage. The maximum amount of the reserve under the employment contracts 
was $3,500. However, the maximum reserve amount was subsequently increased 
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to $7,000. CFI was unable to confirm whether the Sales Representatives received 
advance written notice of this increase in the reserve limit.4
If and when a timeshare purchaser made six timely, consecutive monthly payments 
on the Note and Mortgage, the reserve was "released" as to that sale.  However, if a 
timeshare purchaser upgraded or downgraded their timeshare before making six 
timely, consecutive monthly payments, the account would show that a final 
payment had not been made, and the Sales Representative would not receive a 
commission from that sale.  CFI explained that should a timeshare purchaser 
default, the amount of the commission already paid to the Sales Representative was 
charged against the balance of the reserve, which is commonly referred to as a 
"charge back."  Each such defaulted sale resulted in a charge back until the reserve 
balance was exhausted.  This allowed CFI to recover a portion of the commissions 
paid to Sales Representatives for sales on which CFI did not receive payment of 
the purchase price. However, pursuant to Exhibit A of CFI's employment contract: 
VI. CHARGEBACK ON CANCELED DEALS 
A. During the term that Employee is engaged by 
Employer, no sales originated by Employee for which 
Employee has been paid a commission will be subject 
to charge back except as otherwise set forth herein. 
B. In the event Employee is no longer engaged by 
Employer . . . Employee shall be charged back for all 
sales upon which commissions have been paid in the 
event the purchaser(s) has/have not made six (6) 
timely and consecutive monthly payments as well as 
the ten percent (10%) minimum down payment.  
Timeshare sales were evaluated based on the timeliness and frequency of the 
payments on the Note and Mortgage, and the reserve account appropriately 
reconciled. CFI's commission supervisor, Connie Sharp, testified that when a 
Sales Representative separated from CFI, 100% of their commissions went to fund 
4 Pursuant to Exhibit A of CFI's employment contract, "any changes, modifications 
or adjustments" to the terms of employment "shall be effective upon notice to 
[e]mployee without further modification to this [a]greement."  
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the reserve account and was not "released" without a written demand after 
termination of the employment.  
Q: To your knowledge[,] have any of the Plaintiffs ever 
been given written notice that when they separate from 
the payroll 100 percent of their commissions would go 
into the reserve rather than the 10 percent that's set forth 
in the contract? 
A: Not that I know of. 
. . . . 
Q: And prior to that date, I believe it was in April of 
'09[,] if a salesman for any reason failed to make that 
demand then [CFI] kept his commissions; correct? 
A: We–when they notified us[,] then we would do the 
research but if they didn't[,] then we would [not].
Q: So, if a salesman was fired one day in October and he 
was hit by a bus crossing the street as he left the resort[,]
then no request would ever be made; correct? 
A: Right. 
This practice was not mentioned in the CFI employment contract.  Conversely, the 
contract did provide that once an employee was no longer engaged by CFI, "the 
funds remaining in the reserve account will be reimbursed to the [e]mployee only 
after the [e]mployer has determined that six (6) consecutive and timely monthly 
payments have been made on each sale made by [e]mployee for which [e]mployee 
has been paid a commission."  
Sharp further testified that Sales Representative positions are "seasonal," meaning 
that Sale Representatives are hired in the spring and laid off in the fall.  
On January 11, 2010, the parties to the Parker action reached an agreement as set 
forth in a memorandum of understanding (the MOU).  By order dated January 29, 
2010, Judge Baxley approved the class settlement and incorporated the MOU into 
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the final judgment (the Parker Order).5  The MOU contained the following 
provisions: 
2. Stipulated Judgment. As payment for and satisfaction 
of all claims made or asserted by the Class Claimants or 
which could or should have been made or asserted by the 
Class Claimant[s] for any and all matters occurring or 
arising during the Class Period in connections [sic] with 
commission reserves alleged to be due to Class 
Claimants and owed by CFI, including all claims for 
enhanced (double or treble) or punitive damages and pre-
judgment interest and all claims for future payments of 
commission reserves, and inclusive of attorneys' fees and 
recoverable litigation costs (for which there shall be no 
separate award or recovery), a stipulated judgment shall 
be entered, [on] behalf of all Class Claimants (other than 
those who have opted-out) and Class Counsel (to the 
extent of their entitlement to payment of attorneys' fees 
and reimbursement of litigation costs) and against CFI in 
the amount of Six Hundred Fifty Thousand ($650,000) 
Dollars.
. . . . 
There shall be no further reconciliation or payment of 
reserves following the entry of the Stipulated Judgment.  
This Settlement shall not dispose of the claims for unpaid 
wages (not commission reserves) set forth in the matter 
styled Timothy Zinn et al. v. CFI Sales & Marketing, 
Ltd., Civil Action No. 2009-CP-26-0043 . . ., which shall 
continue unaffected by the Settlement of the Civil 
Action. 
(emphasis added).
5 The Parker Order incorporated the MOU by reference and included a copy of it as 
an exhibit. 
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The Zinn Action 
The Zinn Plaintiffs filed their summons and complaint on January 5, 2009, alleging 
they were entitled to unpaid wages far in excess of the amounts maintained in the 
reserve accounts maintained by CFI and previously claimed in the Parker action.  
The Zinn Plaintiffs sought damages for: (1) wages, penalties, and attorney's fees; 
(2) breach of contract; and (3) breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act.  
The Zinn Plaintiffs further requested an accounting and a declaratory judgment 
"finding [CFI's] practices regarding payment of wages to be in derogation of 
statutory law."  Following an extended discovery period, CFI moved for summary 
judgment, arguing the final Parker Order barred substantially all of the identical 
claims asserted in the Zinn action under the doctrine of res judicata.   
The Honorable Benjamin H. Culbertson called the Zinn action to trial on February 
13, 2012. Before trial began, Judge Culbertson heard extensive arguments on 
CFI's summary judgment motion.  Ultimately, the circuit court ruled that the 
doctrine of res judicata expressly barred the Zinn Plaintiffs from asserting any 
claims that they either raised or could have raised in the Parker action.6  Such 
claims included, but were not limited to, the validity of the reserve and chargeback 
clauses under the Wages Act. See S.C. Code Ann. §§ 41-10-10 to -110 (Supp. 
2014). 
At trial, the Zinn Plaintiffs testified CFI owed them hundreds of thousands of 
dollars in unpaid commissions. Specifically, the Zinn Plaintiffs alleged they made 
sales while employed by CFI for which they did not receive commissions due and 
payable as defined by the employment contracts.  CFI contested these allegations 
and presented testimony that sales commissions became due to Sales 
Representatives only after the occurrence of two conditions precedent:  (1) the 
purchaser did not cancel the deal within the allotted rescission period of seven 
days; and (2) the purchaser made a full down payment, typically 10% of the 
purchase price. CFI admitted that if the final installment of the timeshare 
purchaser's down payment were moved to the end of the ten-year note, the Sales 
Representative would not receive the sales commission for ten years. CFI further 
admitted that the contract did not contain any notice of this fact. Moreover, CFI 
6 The circuit court did not enter a written order granting CFI's motion for summary 
judgment.  
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admitted as a result of a minor accounting oversight, Laura Arrington did not 
timely receive a commission totaling $2,769.  
Although there were initially twenty-five plaintiffs in the Zinn action, the 
following seven plaintiffs failed to appear at trial, and the Zinn Plaintiffs consented 
to their dismissal with prejudice:  Jimmy Kelly, Whitney Renee Knox, Joe 
Maranville, Matthew W. Reed, Gerald Ryba, Stratton Vitikos, and Michael J. 
Zanardo. Thereafter, CFI successfully moved for directed verdict as to the 
following five plaintiffs:  Steven G. Thoni, Khalif Middleton, Lynn C. Lanpher, 
Michael H. Wills, and Sherry Singleton.   
At the close of the evidence, the judge directed a verdict in favor of CFI as to all of 
the Zinn Plaintiffs' claims for breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act, 
and the Zinn Plaintiffs agreed to withdraw the request for an accounting.  Judge 
Culbertson then concluded that the issue of whether CFI violated the Wages Act as 
a result of its alleged non-payment of commissions to the remaining Zinn Plaintiffs 
was a question of law for the court to determine at a later time.  Consequently, the 
circuit court submitted to the jury only the breach of contract claims of the 
following thirteen plaintiffs: Robert Adams, Laura Arrington, Stephen C. Black, 
Bradley Kirk Bray, Mark D'Amico, Thomas DeVitis, Rodney Eddie Haynes, Holly 
Levasseur, John Martin Loughlin, Chelcie Ozentine, Judith A. Parker, Cynthia G. 
Reilly, and Thomas A. Zinn. Thereafter, the jury awarded Arrington the exact 
amount presented in CFI's closing argument.  The jury returned defense verdicts on 
the remaining twelve plaintiffs' claims.  
The Zinn Plaintiffs filed post-trial motions requesting a new trial for the twelve 
plaintiffs whose claims the jury rejected, a tripling of Arrington's damages 
pursuant to the Wages Act, and an award of attorney's fees for all plaintiffs 
regardless of whether they were prevailing parties.  On June 5, 2012, Judge 
Culbertson sent a letter to the parties delineating his post-trial rulings on the 
pending motions and instructing the Zinn Plaintiffs to prepare a proposed order 
memorializing the instructions and findings reflected in his letter.   
As to the Wages Act issue, Judge Culbertson specifically instructed plaintiffs'
counsel to include the following finding:  "The defendant violated the [Wages Act]
by modifying the employment contract without written notice to the employees and 
by failing to pay [Arrington] her wages within the time specified by law."  Thus, it 
appears that Judge Culbertson's ruling as to the Wages Act violation was limited to 
two issues, one of which applied only to the sole prevailing plaintiff, Arrington.  
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Judge Culbertson had previously concluded on summary judgment (and at trial) 
that res judicata barred the court from considering or ruling upon the reserve or 
charge back components of the employment contracts.   
Despite the circuit court's instructions, the proposed order (Zinn Order) contained 
the following proposed findings:   
Here, the contact [sic] of Defendants violates all of the 
above code sections. First, Plaintiffs['] wages were 
reduced without notice.  Second, wages were withheld 
after separation from the payroll.  Third, the chargeback 
scheme is unenforceable and is contrary to the South 
Carolina Payment of Wages Statute in that an employee 
could sell a timeshare product and actually not be paid 
for ten years after the sale. . . . 
For the reasons set forth above, Defendant's employment 
contracts with Plaintiffs violates [sic] the Payment of 
Wages Act as a matter of law and this court so declares 
that the contract is void as against public policy. 
(emphasis added).  Judge Culbertson signed the proposed order as presented on 
July 19, 2012, and it was filed on August 7, 2012. 
CFI subsequently filed a timely Rule 59(e), SCRCP, motion, arguing that the Zinn 
Order (1) did not accurately reflect the court's ruling concerning CFI's entitlement 
to summary judgment on claims involved in the Parker action, and (2) inserted 
objectionable language invalidating CFI's employment agreements based on CFI's 
reserve and charge back systems.  CFI sought "the deletion of the objectionable 
and unfounded language voiding CFI's employment contracts, in particular the 
purported findings that reserve and charge back provision violated the [Wages] 
Act." 
CFI argues "the belated, improper language unilaterally inserted by the plaintiffs'
counsel not only contravened the trial judge's ruling, but was also intended to 
circumvent the doctrine of res judicata as a legal bar to any subsequent re-
litigation of all claims that were the subject of the Parker judgment, including the 
validity of the reserve and charge back provisions under the [Wages] Act."  CFI 
further asserted the circuit court could not have found such a wholesale violation of 
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the Wages Act as to all of the Zinn Plaintiffs—for modifying the terms of the 
contracts without written notice—without contradicting the jury's defense verdicts 
as to all of the Zinn Plaintiffs with the exception of Arrington.  By form order filed 
on September 27, 2012, the circuit court denied CFI's Rule 59(e), SCRCP, motion.   
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
CFI raises one issue on appeal: 
I.	 Did the circuit court err in finding that the reserve and charge back 
components of CFI's employment contracts with the Zinn Plaintiffs violated 
the South Carolina Payment of Wages Act? 
The Zinn Plaintiffs raise four issues on cross-appeal: 
I.	 Did the circuit court err in directing a verdict against Lanpher, Middleton, 
Singleton, Thoni, and Wills?
II.	 Did the circuit court err in directing a verdict against the Zinn Plaintiffs on 
their cause of action for breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act?
III.	 Did the circuit court err in allowing the jury to consider terms of the contract 
that the court subsequently determined to be illicit? 
IV.	 Did the circuit court err in limiting the amount of attorney's fees awarded?
ANALYSIS OF CFI'S APPEAL 
CFI asserts the circuit court erred in finding the reserve and charge back 
components of CFI's employment contracts with the Zinn Plaintiffs violated the 
Wages Act, arguing that:  (1) the doctrine of res judicata barred the circuit court's 
post-trial review of the legality of CFI's reserve and charge back systems under the 
Wages Act; (2) the language in the Zinn Order contradicts its oral ruling at trial as 
well as the jury's verdicts against all plaintiffs except Arrington; (3) CFI's 
employment contracts do not violate the Wages Act; and (4) the circuit court 
should not have tripled Arrington's damages or awarded attorney's fees without 
specifically basing those remedies on the late payment to Arrington.  
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I. Res Judicata 
CFI argues that because identical parties previously litigated the legality of CFI's 
reserve and/or charge back systems under the Wages Act in the Parker action, the 
circuit court properly ruled the doctrine of res judicata precluded any subsequent 
re-litigation. 
"Res judicata bars subsequent actions by the same parties when the claims arise out 
of the same transaction or occurrence that was the subject of a prior action between 
those parties."  Plum Creek Dev. Co. v. City of Conway, 334 S.C. 30, 34, 512 
S.E.2d 106, 109 (1999). "Under the doctrine of res judicata, '[a] litigant is barred 
from raising any issues which were adjudicated in the former suit and any issues 
which might have been raised in the former suit.'" Id. (quoting Hilton Head Ctr. of 
S.C., Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of S.C., 294 S.C. 9, 11, 362 S.E.2d 176, 177 
(1987)). "[T]he fundamental purpose of res judicata . . . is to ensure that 'no one 
should be twice sued for the same cause of action.'" Judy v. Judy, 393 S.C. 160, 
173, 712 S.E.2d 408, 414 (2011) (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Greenville v. U.S. 
Fid. & Guar. Co., 207 S.C. 15, 24, 35 S.E.2d 47, 56 (1945)).  "Res judicata is 
shown if (1) the identities of the parties is the same as a prior litigation; (2) the 
subject matter is the same as in the prior litigation; and (3) there was a prior 
adjudication of the issue by a court of competent jurisdiction."  Johnson v. 
Greenwood Mills, Inc., 317 S.C. 248, 250–51, 452 S.E.2d 832, 833 (1994). "Our 
courts, however, have found that the doctrine of res judicata is not an 'ironclad bar' 
to a later lawsuit."  Judy, 393 S.C. at 167, 712 S.E.2d at 412. "Although there is no 
dispute in our jurisprudence regarding the three elements of res judicata, our courts 
have utilized at least four tests in determining whether a claim should have been 
raised in a prior suit."7 Id. at 171, 712 S.E.2d at 414 (citation omitted).    
7 See James F. Flanagan, South Carolina Civil Procedure 649–50 (2d ed. 1996) 
("South Carolina courts have used at least four tests to determine when a claim
should have been raised in the first suit: (1) when there is identity of the subject 
matter in both cases; (2) when the first and second cases involve the same primary 
right held by the plaintiff and one primary wrong committed by the defendant; (3) 
when there is the same evidence in both cases; and recently, (4) when the claims 
arise out of the same transaction or occurrence that is the subject of the prior 
action."). 
37 

   
 
 
  
   
 
 
 
 
A. Identity of Parties
Our review of the record reveals that all of the Zinn Plaintiffs were also plaintiffs 
in the Parker action, and CFI is the sole defendant in both cases. 
Respondents/Appellants do not contend that the parties are not identical.   
B. Subject Matter
CFI asserts the subject matter of the Parker action "is virtually indistinguishable 
from the Zinn action," as the Parker Plaintiffs and the Zinn Plaintiffs set forth the 
same causes of action and request the same relief in their complaints. Moreover,
the Parker Plaintiffs and Zinn Plaintiffs sought an accounting as well as a 
declaratory judgment "finding [CFI's] practices regarding payment of wages to be 
in derogation of statutory law . . ." The only noticeable difference in the two 
complaints is that the Parker Plaintiffs requested class certification while the Zinn 
Plaintiffs did not. Therefore, we find CFI has established the identical nature of 
the subject matter in the Parker action and the Zinn action.    
C. Adjudication of the Issue 
CFI argues res judicata bars not only claims actually decided in the Parker action, 
but those which could have been so decided.  The Zinn Plaintiffs challenge the 
existence of this third element of the res judicata doctrine, arguing the court in 
Parker did not specifically rule on whether CFI's contractually implemented 
reserve and/or charge back procedure violated the Wages Act.  As Judge Baxley's 
order in the Parker action (the Parker Order) addressed with finality the validity of 
the reserve and charge back procedure under the Wages Act, we agree with CFI 
that this issue has been adjudicated for purposes of the Zinn action.   
"[R]es judicata[, which] is more commonly referred to simply as claim preclusion . 
. . bars plaintiffs from pursuing a later suit where the claim (1) was litigated or (2) 
could have been litigated." Catawba Indian Nation v. State, 407 S.C. 526, 537, 
756 S.E.2d 900, 906 (2014) (citations omitted).  "Although res judicata normally 
applies to issues that were previously raised or that could have been raised in the 
prior action, declaratory judgments are distinguishable."  Id. at 539, 756 S.E.2d at 
908. 
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As one legal treatise has observed, res judicata does 
apply to declaratory judgments, but only as to issues 
actually decided by the court: 
Suits for declaratory judgments do not fall within the rule 
that a former judgment is conclusive not only of all 
matters actually adjudicated thereby but, in addition, also 
of all matters which could have been presented for 
adjudication. A declaratory judgment is not res judicata 
as to matters not at issue and not passed upon.  Unlike 
other judgments, a declaratory judgment determines only 
what it actually decides and does not preclude, under res 
judicata principles, other claims that might have been 
advanced. 
Id. at 539–40, 756 S.E.2d at 908. 
The Parker Order incorporates by reference "Exhibit A," which is the parties'
January 11, 2010 MOU. The MOU provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
2. Stipulated Judgment. As payment for and satisfaction of all 
claims made or asserted by the Class Claimants or which could 
or should have been made or asserted by the Class Claimant[s] 
for any and all matters occurring or arising during the Class 
Period in connections [sic] with commission reserves alleged to 
be due to Class Claimants and owed by CFI, including all 
claims for enhanced (double or treble) or punitive damages and 
pre-judgment interest and all claims for future payments of 
commission reserves, and inclusive of attorneys' fees and 
recoverable litigation costs (for which there shall be no separate 
award or recovery), a stipulated judgment shall be entered . . . . 
Consequently, we agree with CFI that res judicata barred Judge Culbertson's post-
trial review of the legality of CFI's reserve and/or charge back systems under the 
Wages Act. Thus, we reverse the circuit court as to this issue and remand with 
instructions for the circuit court to issue an amended order deleting the 
unsupported findings.   
39 

  
 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE ZINN PLAINTIFFS' CROSS-APPEAL 
The Zinn Plaintiffs raise four issues on appeal, asserting the circuit court erred in:  
(1) directing a verdict against Lanpher, Middleton, Singleton, Thoni, and Wills; (2) 
directing a verdict against the remaining Zinn Plaintiffs on their causes of action 
for breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act; (3) allowing the jury to 
consider terms of the contract that the court subsequently determined to be illicit; 
and (4) limiting the amount of attorney's fees awarded.   
I. Directed Verdict 
When reviewing the circuit court's ruling on a motion for a directed verdict, this 
court must apply the same standard as the trial court by viewing the evidence and 
all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.  Elam 
v. S.C. Dep't of Transp., 361 S.C. 9, 27–28, 602 S.E.2d 772, 782 (2004).  The 
circuit court must deny a motion for a directed verdict if the evidence yields more 
than one reasonable inference or its inference is in doubt.  Strange v. S.C. Dep't of 
Highways & Pub. Transp., 314 S.C. 427, 429, 445 S.E.2d 439, 440 (1994). In 
considering a motion for directed verdict, neither the circuit court nor the appellate 
court has the authority to decide credibility issues or to resolve conflicts in the 
testimony or the evidence.  Welch v. Epstein, 342 S.C. 279, 300, 536 S.E.2d 408, 
419 (Ct. App. 2000). "The appellate court will reverse the trial court's ruling on a 
[directed verdict] motion only when there is no evidence to support the ruling or 
where the ruling is controlled by an error of law."  Law v. S.C. Dept. of 
Corrections, 368 S.C. 424, 434–35, 629 S.E.2d 642, 648 (2006). 
A. Lanpher, Middleton, Singleton, Thoni, and Wills 
The Zinn Plaintiffs argue the circuit court erred in directing a verdict against 
Lanpher, Middleton, Singleton, Thoni, and Wills.  We disagree. 
1. Preservation 
Initially, we question whether the Zinn Plaintiffs have abandoned this issue on 
appeal as their argument is conclusory.  See First Sav. Bank v. McLean, 314 S.C. 
361, 363, 444 S.E.2d 513, 514 (1994) (noting that when a party fails to cite 
authority or when the argument is simply a conclusory statement, the party is 
deemed to have abandoned the issue on appeal).  In their appellate brief, the Zinn 
Plaintiffs argue they "testified to facts sufficient to take their case to the jury" but 
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fail to offer any facts to support their argument.  In their reply brief, the Zinn 
Plaintiffs offer testimony from each of these plaintiffs, including when they were
employed by CFI, how they were paid, whether they were paid all wages due 
within thirty days of separation from CFI, and the amount they believed they were 
owed by CFI. The circuit court granted CFI's motion to strike the testimony of 
Thoni and Middleton. As this was not appealed, the circuit court's ruling on the 
motion to strike stands.  See Shirley's Iron Works, Inc. v. City of Union, 403 S.C. 
560, 573, 743 S.E.2d 778, 785 (2013) ("An unappealed ruling is the law of the case 
and requires affirmance."). Therefore, we find this argument is preserved for 
appellate review only as to Lanpher, Singleton, and Wills.  
2. Merits
In Huffines Co. v. Lockhart, 365 S.C. 178, 190, 617 S.E.2d 125, 131 (Ct. App. 
2005), this court explained that "[a] real estate broker suing on a conditional sales 
contract has the burden of proving that all conditions precedent to his right to a 
commission have occurred."  See also Champion v. Whaley, 280 S.C. 116, 120, 
311 S.E.2d 404, 406 (Ct. App. 1984).  
Thus, a broker who sues for his commission ordinarily 
has the burden of proving that any conditions precedent 
to the duty of the seller to pay have been fulfilled. But if 
the seller prevents a condition from occurring, then the 
condition is excused and his obligation to pay becomes 
unconditional.  This is simply an instance of the general 
rule that one who prevents a condition of a contract 
cannot rely on the other party's resulting nonperformance 
in an action on the contract.   
Champion, 280 S.C. at 120, 311 S.E.2d at 406 (internal citations omitted). 
CFI's commission supervisor, Connie Sharp, testified commissions became due to 
a Sales Representative only after the occurrence of two conditions precedent:8  (1) 
8 "A condition precedent to a contract is 'any fact other than the lapse of time, 
which, unless excused, must exist or occur before a duty of immediate 
performance arises.'" Brewer v. Stokes Kia, Isuzu, Subaru, Inc., 364 S.C. 444, 449, 
613 S.E.2d 802, 805 (Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Worley v. Yarborough Ford, Inc., 
317 S.C. 206, 210, 452 S.E.2d 622, 624 (Ct. App. 1994)). 
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the purchaser did not cancel the deal within the allotted rescission period of seven 
days; and (2) the purchaser made a ten percent down payment.  
The record reveals the Zinn Plaintiffs whose claims survived directed verdict were 
able to provide the jury with details regarding sales for which they did not receive 
compensation, including the names of the timeshare purchasers and the 
corresponding account numbers.  On the other hand, Lanpher, Singleton, and 
Willis—plaintiffs against whom the verdicts were directed—failed to provide such 
sales specifics. Thus, we agree with the circuit court's ruling that any judgments 
awarded to Lanpher, Singleton, and Willis would have been "based exclusively on 
speculation, conjecture or surmise." See Parrish v. Allison, 376 S.C. 308, 319–20, 
656 S.E.2d 382, 388 (Ct. App. 2007) (explaining that the trial court may not submit 
"speculative, theoretical, and hypothetical views to the jury").  Accordingly, we 
affirm the directed verdicts granted against Lanpher, Middleton, Singleton, Thoni, 
and Wills.
B. Breach of Contract Accompanied by a Fraudulent Act 
The Zinn Plaintiffs argue that the circuit court erred in directing a verdict in favor 
of CFI regarding their claims for breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent 
act. In order to maintain a claim for breach of contract accompanied by a 
fraudulent act, a plaintiff must prove three elements:  (1) a breach of contract; (2) 
"[f]raudulent intent relating to the breaching of the contract and not merely to its 
making;" and (3) "[a] fraudulent act accompanying the breach."  Floyd v. Country 
Squire Mobile Homes, Inc., 287 S.C. 51, 53–54, 336 S.E.2d 502, 503–04 (Ct. App. 
1985) (citations omitted).  "The fraudulent act is any act characterized by 
dishonesty in fact or unfair dealing." Conner v. City of Forest Acres, 348 S.C. 454, 
466, 560 S.E.2d 606, 612 (2002). 
"Fraud," in this sense, "assumes so many hues and forms, 
that courts are compelled to content themselves with 
comparatively few general rules for its discovery and 
defeat, and allow the facts and circumstances peculiar to 
each case to bear heavily upon the conscience and 
judgment of the court or jury in determining its presence 
or absence." 
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Id. (quoting Sullivan v. Calhoun, 117 S.C. 137, 139, 108 S.E. 189, 189 (1921)).  
"Breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act . . . requires proof of 
fraudulent intent relating to the breaching of the contract and not merely to its 
making. Such proof may or may not involve false representations."  Ball v. 
Canadian Am. Express Co., 314 S.C. 272, 276, 442 S.E.2d 620, 623 (Ct. App. 
1994) (citation omitted).  "Fraudulent intent is normally proved by circumstances 
surrounding the breach." Floyd, 287 S.C. at 54, 336 S.E.2d at 503–04.  "The 
fraudulent act may be prior to, contemporaneous with, or subsequent to the breach 
of contract, but it must be connected with the breach itself and cannot be too 
remote in either time or character."  Id. at 54, 336 S.E.2d at 504. 
Although each Sales Representative contractually agreed to fund the reserve 
account with 10% of the commissions earned up to a maximum amount of $3,500, 
CFI withheld more than 10% of their commissions and increased the maximum
reserve amount to $7,000 without notice. Despite attracting job applicants by 
advertising "no commission chargebacks," testimony established that should a 
timeshare purchaser default, the amount of the commission already paid to the 
Sales Representative was indeed charged against the balance of the reserve.  
Further, although such a provision is not contained in the employment contract, 
Sharp testified that when a Sales Representative separated from CFI, 100% of their 
commissions went to fund the reserve account and were not "released" without a 
written demand six months after termination.  
The circuit court allowed the jury to consider the remaining plaintiffs' breach of 
contract claims; however, only Arrington received an award.  The jury returned 
defense verdicts on all other breach of contract claims.  Thereafter, the Zinn 
Plaintiffs moved for a new trial and for JNOV on the claims for breach of contract 
accompanied by a fraudulent act.  However, the Zinn Plaintiffs did not make any 
post-trial motions regarding their claims for breach of contract.  Therefore, we find 
the Zinn Plaintiffs, with the exception of Arrington, failed to preserve or establish 
that CFI breached their employment contracts.  Accordingly, we reverse the circuit
court's directed verdict only as to Arrington's claim for breach of contract 
accompanied by a fraudulent act.  We affirm the circuit court's ruling as to all other 
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plaintiffs whose claims for breach of contract went to the jury and resulted in 
defense verdicts.9
II. Terms of the Contract 
As best as we can determine, the Zinn Plaintiffs next argue the circuit court erred 
in granting partial summary judgment and instructing the jury not to consider 
reserve funds prior to January 2010.  The Zinn Plaintiffs further assert the circuit 
court erred in not permitting the jury to consider their claims under the Wages Act.  
We question whether the Zinn Plaintiffs have abandoned this issue on appeal as 
they failed to cite any authority on this point in either their appellate brief or reply 
brief. See Broom v. Jennifer J., 403 S.C. 96, 115, 742 S.E.2d 382, 391 (2013) 
(finding an issue abandoned where the party's brief cited only one family court rule 
and presented no argument as to how the family court's ruling was an abuse of 
discretion or constituted prejudice); First Sav. Bank, 314 S.C. at 363, 444 S.E.2d at 
514 (noting that when a party fails to cite authority or when the argument is simply 
a conclusory statement, the party is deemed to have abandoned the issue on 
appeal); State v. Lindsey, 394 S.C. 354, 363, 714 S.E.2d 554, 558 (Ct. App. 2011) 
("An issue is deemed abandoned and will not be considered on appeal if the 
argument is raised in a brief but not supported by authority."). 
Additionally, the Zinn Plaintiffs appear to change their argument in reply to "the 
trial court erred in denying motions for a new trial and JNOV," but the basis for the 
argument is not reasonably clear. See Rule 208(b)(1)(B), SCACR ("Ordinarily, no 
point will be considered which is not set forth in the statement of the issues on 
appeal."); but see Herron v. Century BMW, 395 S.C. 461, 466, 719 S.E.2d 640, 
642 (2011) ("When an issue is not specifically set out in the statements of issues, 
the appellate court may nevertheless consider the issue if it is reasonably clear
from an appellant's arguments."); see also Glasscock, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. 
Co., 348 S.C. 76, 81, 557 S.E.2d 689, 692 (Ct. App. 2001) ("[A]n argument made 
9 "In an action at law, on appeal of a case tried by a jury, the jurisdiction of the 
appellate court extends merely to the correction of errors of law, and a factual 
finding by the jury will not be disturbed unless a review of the record discloses that 
there is no evidence which reasonably supports the jury's findings."  Erickson v. 
Jones Street Publishers, LLC, 368 S.C. 444, 464, 629 S.E.2d 653, 663–64 (2006).
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in a reply brief cannot present an issue to the appellate court if it was not addressed 
in the initial brief").  Therefore, we find unpreserved the Zinn Plaintiffs' remaining 
arguments challenging the granting of partial summary judgment and the denial of 
their motions for a new trial and JNOV.  
III. Attorney's Fees and Treble Damages 
The Zinn Plaintiffs contend the circuit court erred in awarding only 1/25 of the 
attorney's fees requested in their post-trial motions.   
"[T]he specific amount of attorneys' fees awarded pursuant to a statute authorizing 
reasonable attorneys' fees is left to the discretion of the trial judge and will not be 
disturbed absent an abuse of discretion." Layman v. State, 376 S.C. 434, 444, 658 
S.E.2d 320, 325 (2008).
Pursuant to South Carolina Code section 41-10-80(C), "[i]n case of any failure to 
pay wages due to an employee as required by [s]ection 41-10-40 or 41-10-50 the 
employee may recover in a civil action an amount equal to three times the full 
amount of the unpaid wages, plus costs and reasonable attorney's fees as the court 
may allow." S.C. Code Ann. § 41-10-80(C) (Supp. 2014).  "The language of § 41-
10-80(C) is discretionary and not mandatory." Temple v. Tec-Fab, Inc., 381 S.C. 
597, 600, 675 S.E.2d 414, 415 (2009). "In Rice v. Multimedia, Inc., 318 S.C. 95, 
98, 456 S.E.2d 381, 383 (1995), [our supreme court] held that the imposition of 
treble damages in those cases where there is a bona fide dispute would be unjust 
and harsh." Id. The Court explained: 
[T]here are some wage disputes when the issue may
involve a valid close question of law or fact which should 
properly be decided by the courts.  We do not believe the 
legislature intended to deter the litigation of reasonable 
good faith wage disputes; we do believe the legislature 
intended to punish the employer who forces the 
employee to resort to the court in an unreasonable or bad 
faith wage dispute. 
Id. (quoting Rice, 318 S.C. at 99, 456 S.E.2d at 384). 
The Zinn Plaintiffs sought attorney's fees of $54,276.  However, because only 
Arrington prevailed, the circuit court awarded a pro rata share of the requested 
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attorney's fees in the total sum of $2,171.04 and trebled damages to Arrington.  
While we see no abuse of discretion here, we remand the award of attorney's fees 
and treble damages to Arrington so that the circuit court may articulate the bases 
for these awards. 
CONCLUSION 
We hold the doctrine of res judicata barred the circuit court's post-trial review of 
the legality of CFI's reserve and charge back systems under the Wages Act.  We 
also find the challenged language in the post-trial Zinn Order contradicts the circuit 
court's res judicata ruling and the jury's verdicts against all plaintiffs save
Arrington. Thus, we reverse and remand with instructions for the circuit court to 
issue an amended order deleting the unsupported findings.  
We affirm the circuit court's directed verdicts against Lanpher, Middleton, 
Singleton, Thoni, and Wills. As to all remaining Zinn Plaintiffs, other than 
Arrington, we affirm the circuit court's directed verdicts on the claims for breach of 
contract accompanied by a fraudulent act.  We reverse the circuit court's directed 
verdict only as to Arrington's claim for breach of contract accompanied by a 
fraudulent act. We hold unpreserved the Zinn Plaintiffs' remaining arguments 
challenging the circuit court's granting of partial summary judgment and denial of 
the motions for a new trial and JNOV.  We remand the award of attorney's fees and 
treble damages to Arrington so the circuit court may articulate the bases for these 
treble damages and attorney's fee awards.  Accordingly, the findings and decisions 
of the circuit court are 
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED. 
SHORT and LOCKEMY, JJ., concur.
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